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I. Introduction 
hen investors decide to buy shares or stocks in 
any company, there is the initial presumption 
that the company would in turn make profits 
which would then be delivered to them based on their 
investment. However, more often than not, there are 
cases where investors are faced with the situation 
whereby their investments could go down the drain due 
to bad corporate governance practices of the company-
ies in which the investments are made. Bad corporate 
governance practices and indeed control fraud have led 
to insider abuse whereby directors have failed to 
perform their fiduciary duties in proper management of 
the companies’ assets. 
These problems could be further compounded 
by the ignorant or complacent nature of shareholders 
with regards to their rights and responsibilities. In 
Nigeria, it can be said that shareholders are mainly 
faced with the problem of ignorance and in cases where 
they are actually aware of their rights; there is a passive 
nature of inexperience as to best approach possible in 
the circumstances. 
That notwithstanding, the recent banking crisis 
in Nigeria which is the subject matter of this paper has 
created a lot of awareness relating to shareholder activi-
sm in the country. These are seen in forms of Policies, 
Regulations and Scholarly Articles aimed at educating 
shareholders of their rights and responsibilities in the 
company.  
In view of this, it is the focus of this chapter to 
examine the extent to which shareholders can be said to 
have contributed to the banking crisis in Nigeria, taking 
into account the first five banks declared by the CBN as 
financially unstable. These are Oceanic Bank, Interconti-
nental bank, Union bank, Afri bank and Finbank. The 
paper will commence with an analysis of the concept of 
ownership and control, examining the agency problem 
associated with director-shareholder relationships. This 
will then be followed by an investigation of the legal 
position of shareholders rights and responsibilities in 
Nigeria, using the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 




2007. There will be a discussion of shareholder 
meetings and voting rights, following which the nature of 
Share-holder activism in Nigeria will be explored. The 
paper seeks to argue that apart from ignorance and 
illiteracy on the part of the shareholders, the general 
state of corporate governance practice in the country 
has been influenced by institutionalised political corrupt-
tion, corporate fraud and regulatory manipulation to 
which shareholders are victims. 
II. Separation of Ownership and 
Control: The Agency Problem 
Generally, an organization is more likely to 
survive when it produces goods to customers at the 
lowest price possible while still covering costs.1 Fama 
and Jensen2 examines the separation of risk bearing 
and decision functions observed in large corporations, 
otherwise known as ownership and control respectively 
and argue that the contract structures of organizations 
generally tend to separate the ratification and monitoring 
of decisions from the initiation and implementation of 
the decisions.3 This hypothesis will be analysed in detail 
below. 
They start by referring to the definition of an 
organisation as posed by Jensen and Meckling4 to the 
effect that an organisation is made up of a totality of 
contracts, whether written and unwritten, among owners 
of factors of production and customers. According to 
them, these contracts are the ‘rules of the game’ and 
would specify two things: the nature of residual claims 
and the allocation of the steps of the decision process 
among agents.5  
The nature of contract of organisations usually 
tend to limit the risk borne by most agents; and this is 
achieved by specifying fixed promised payoffs and 
incentives that are attached to measures of performa-
nce. The risk of the probability of cash flows to promised 
payments to agents (otherwise known as the residual 
risk), is borne by another set of agents identified by 
Fama and Jensen as the residual risk bearers or the 
1 This will be analysed subsequently in detail. 
2 Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C. 1983. "Separation of ownership and 
control", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-25. 
3 Fama and Jensen supra at p. 302. 
4 Jensen, M and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
5 Fama and Jensen supra at p. 302. 
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residual claimants.6 However, mention must be made of 
the fact that most agents’ contracts explicitly provide 
that the agent consents that in the exchange of a 
specified amount, the resources he provides can be 
used to satisfy the interests of the residual claimants.7 
The effect of having most of these risks borne 
by the residual claimants would create a survival value 
whereby lesser costs would be incurred to monitor 
contracts with the other group of agents. Furthermore, it 
would lead to more production at lower costs which 
would not only increase net cash flows, but also 
contribute to organisation’s survival. 
They then examined the way organisations 
allocate the various steps of decision process across 
agents as a vital element of survival for the 
organisation.8 They explain this through four steps of 
decision processes. First is the initiation stage which, to 
them involves the series of proposals which are utilized 
for structuring of the contracts; this is then followed by 
the ratification stage where the choice of decision 
initiatives to be implemented is made. The third stage 
involves the actual implementation and execution of the 
decisions so ratified; while the last stage involves 
monitoring, that is, the measuring the performance of 
the decision agents and implementation of rewards.9 
They further group the initiation and implementation 
stage as being performed by the same agents and 
therefore termed decision management while the 
ratification and monitoring stage is known as decision 
control, performed by another set of agents. These two 
serves as components of an organisations decision 
process. 
At the end, their analysis produced two 
complementary hypotheses about the relationship 
between decision systems and residual claims: 
1. Separation of residual risk bearing from decision 
management leads to decision systems that 
separate decision management from decision 
control:  
2. Combination of decision management and decision 
control in a few agents leads to residual claims that 
are largely restricted to these few agents.10 
The above led them to conclude that where 
decision management and decision control functions 
effectively in one or more agents, it becomes effective in 
controlling agency problems that could arise between 
residual claimants and decision makers because the 
residual claims are restricted to the decision makers.  
6 These are persons who contract for the right to net cash flows and 
can be said to be shareholders. See Fama and Jensen supra at p. 303 
7 Fama and Jensen supra. 
8 Fama and Jensen supra at p.303. 
9 See Fama and Jensen supra.  
10 Residual risk bearing is otherwise known as ‘Ownership’, while 
decision management refers to ‘control’. See Fama and Jensen supra 
at p. 322-323. 
This agency problem identified by Fama and 
Jensen is in relation to ‘costs’ and is analysed below. 
Tricker considers Agency relationship through 
the lens of the agency dilemma whereby directors 
seeking to maximize their own personal benefit, take 
actions that are advantageous to themselves but 
detrimental to the shareholders.11 An important element 
in any agency relationship is trust. Tricker defines trust 
as an agreement between parties with asymmetrical 
access to information.12 This is premised on the fact that 
directors are well knowledgeable in the conduct of 
business activities and are professionally trained to do 
so; therefore the shareholders must trust them to do 
their job. 
Jensen and Meckling13 define agency 
relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal.14 They further examined the ownership 
structure of a corporation, taking into account how the 
equity ownership by managers can be said to align their 
interests with that of the owners.  
According to them, the principal is able to limit 
divergences from his interest through the creation of 
various incentives to which the agent can benefit from 
and engaging in monitoring costs aimed at limiting 
future deviant activities of the agent.15 For example, 
providing bonding costs for the agent to guarantee that 
he will not harm the principal, and where this happens, 
ensuring that the principal is compensated. However, 
more often than not, there will be a discrepancy 
11 Bob Tricker, Coporate Governance, Principles and Practices, 2009 
Oxford University Press, P. 219. 
12 Bob Tricker supra. 
13 Jensen, M and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
14 Jensen, M. And Meckling, W. (1976) supra at p. 310. It can be said 
that agency theory developed within economics and has since served 
as a foundation for most scholarly research in corporate governance 
and has provided foundation for a more powerful approach to theories 
of corporate governance. See Clarke, T. (ed)  Theories of Corporate 
Governance: The philosophical foundations of Corporate Governance, 
2004 Routledge, Robert A.G. Monks, Nell Minow: Corporate 
governance - 2nd ed. Oxford Blackwell Business, 2001, Eisenhardt 
K.M. , Agency Theory, An Assessment and Review, (1989) Academy of 
Management Review, Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C. 1983. "Separation of 
ownership and control", Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-25, 
Jensen, M and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. As a theory, the principal-agent 
relationship lends more insight to shareholders and boards as entities. 
Also, as identified by Tricker (supra at p.220), activities and 
relationships within the board are treated as a black box and most 
research based on agency theory involved readily available data such 
as financial statements and director reports. 
15 Supra at p.310.  
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between the agents’ decisions and decisions that would 
serve to optimize the interest of the principal. This is 
because it is generally not feasible for either the 
principal or agent to ensure that the agent will make vital 
decisions in the interest of the principal at no cost; 
generally, monitoring and bonding costs are usually 
incurred.16 
Agency costs is defined by Jensen and 
Meckling to include monitoring expenditures incurred by 
the principal, bonding expenditures incurred by the 
agent, as well as residual loss.17 
Going back to Fama and Jensen, organisations 
that tend to separate residual risk bearing from decision 
management are generally complex in nature because 
valuable information are then diffused among many 
agents of the organisation, therefore what we have in 
most complex organisations is a sort of ‘part’ separation 
because effective decision systems are diffuse. This is 
because where there are many residual claimants, it 
becomes a costly exercise for all of them to be involved 
in decision control; hence, the separation of residual risk 
from decision control, and this, no doubt creates agency 
problems residual claimants and decision agents. The 
separation of decision management and control at all 
stages in the organisation would ultimately help to 
control possible agency problems. This is because it 
would limit the power of individual agents to expropriate 
the interests of residual claimants.18 Thus, the 
separation of decision management and control would 
be effective in complex organisations as they would 
both allow relevant applicable knowledge to be utilised 
as and at when due because they help to control the 
agency problems that is posed by diffuse residual 
claims. Furthermore, in decision control systems where 
decision agents bear little or no share of the cost effects 
of their decision, what is seen is a multiple-member 
board of directors that tend to ratify and monitor 
important decisions as well as choosing, rewarding and 
dismissing important decision agents.19 This would then 
make it difficult for any form of collusion between 
decision management at the top and control agents; 
and this is what makes separation of ownership 
(residual risk) and control (decision management) a vital 
decision of an organisation. 
 
16 Otherwise known as pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. See 
Jensen and Meckling supra. 
17 It is important to note that monitoring goes beyond measuring and 
observing the agents behaviour from time to time, it also includes 
practical efforts of the principal to ‘control’ the behaviour of the agent, 
such as operational rules, policies, and the likes. Residual loss refers 
to agency costs incurred despite appropriate monitoring. See Jensen 
and Meckling supra  at p.310-311.  
18 Jensen and Meckling supra at p.323. 
19 Jensen and Meckling supra. 
III. Nature of Shareholding Practice 
and Structure in Nigeria 
As the most populated country in West Africa 
with natural resources ranging from crude oil to agricul-
ture,20 Nigeria has one of the largest Stock Exchange 
Markets in Africa, known as the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE).21  
The Stock Exchange is a self regulating entity 
set up to support the SEC in supervision of its activities 
within the security market. The purpose of the NSE is to 
monitor compliance with the financial requirement of 
listed companies on behalf of the SEC.22 In effect; this 
requirement measures the level of good corporate 
governance in any company. It seeks to protect share-
holders interest by requiring prior approval of making 
annual report available to shareholders before the 
annual general meeting and this approval may be 
withheld in case of discrepancies in the report in which 
case it is subject to correction.23 
The NSE started operations in 1961 with 19 
securities listed for trading. The requirement for shares 
to be quoted on the market initially received a lazy 
response and as at 1970, only 20 companies had their 
shares quoted in the market, even though there were 
about 2000 foreign owned enterprises in Nigeria at the 
time.24 However, today there are 260 Securities listed on 
the Exchange, made up of 10 Government Stocks, 55 
Industrial Loan (Debenture/Preference) Stocks and 195 
Equity / Ordinary Shares of Companies, all with a total 
market capitalization of N875.2 billion.25 Most of the 
listed Companies in Nigeria have foreign affiliations and 
cuts across various sections of the economy ranging 
from Agriculture to manufacturing and services. The 
largest Plc listed on the exchange, Dangote Cement has 
an asset value of $2.1 Billion and a Market value of 
$12.5 Billion. Being the richest company in Nigeria, it 
ranks 1434 position in the list of the World’s Biggest 
Public Companies.26 
20 The 2009 estimates revealed that the country’s total population is in 
excess of 154 million, The Nigerian economy is largely based on Oil 
production which accounts for about 80% of its Gross Domestic 
Product and more than 90% of its exports. See http://www.Mben 
di.com.energysector.html Last accessed 06.08.13. 
21 Formerly known as the Lagos Stock Exchange, the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange is the second largest stock market in Africa The first being 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE): http://www.advfn.com/ 
StockExchanges/about/JSE/JohannesburgStockExchange.html Last 
assessed 27.08.11. 
22 Source: NSE Website available at: http://www.nse.com.ng/About 
Us/Pages/The-NSE.aspx last accessed 20.10.13. 
23 NSE Website supra. 
24 Elewechi N. M. Okike, Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the status 
quo, 2007 Volume 15 Number 2 March  p.173 – 193. 
25 Figures as at 2003. Source: The Nigerian Stock Exchange available 
at: http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/quoted_companies.jsp 
Last Accessed 06-08-2011. 
26 See http://www.forbes.com/global2000/#p_144_s_acompanyRank 
Overall_All_All_All Last accessed 06.08.2011. 
                                                             
                                                             

























































What is known as the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria was a former colony of Britain. The first 
companies to operate in Nigeria therefore were British 
Companies Chattered in England. Foreign companies 
had foreign ownership status that granted them 
absolute rights and privileges associated with it. Legal 
activities began in 1876 when Lagos, the then Federal 
Capital Territory was ceded to the British Crown.  
Following the amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern protectorates in 1914and the establishment of 
a Supreme Court for the whole country, an Ordinance 
was also promulgated for the whole country. Section 14 
of the new Ordinance provided that: 
‘Subject to the terms of this or any other 
Ordinance, the Common Law, the Doctrines of Equity 
and the Statutes of General Application which were in 
force in England on the 1st of January 1900, shall be in 
force within the jurisdiction of the court’. 
The above provision laid the foundation of 
Company Law in Nigeria as the English Common Law 
and Doctrines of Equity as it applied to English Compa-
ny Law became applicable to Nigeria. The Companies 
Ordinanceof1912 was the first Company law in Nigeria, 
based on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 
1908.  
The independence of the country in 1960 
necessitated the need for local control of public 
infrastructure. In this regard, the government effected a 
major change in ownership and control structure of 
Nigerian corporations prohibiting absolute ownership by 
foreign investors.27 The activities of the government in 
the encouragement of local participation in economic 
activities led to the enactments of various Acts from 
1962 to 1977. Two major legislations passed to this 
effect were the Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 known as 
the FX Act and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree (NEPD) No. 4 of 1972, often referred to as the 
Indigenization Decree. The purpose of these Acts was to 
reserve for Nigerians those areas where they had the 
experience and capital to run. The FX Act prohibited the 
transfer of security or interest of security outside Nigeria 
without the permission of the Minister of Finance. The 
NEPD on the other hand, in a bid to restrict foreign 
ownership created three types of enterprises28. First, 
there are enterprises exclusively reserved for Nigerians, 
which basically was a reflection of the Nation’s 
economic, financial and corporate needs at the time. 
There were also enterprises in which Nigerians are not 
allowed to own more than 40% of shares in which case 
foreign companies had the opportunity to invest in the 
country, generating foreign capital and managerial 
expertise for Nigeria. The third sector was enterprises in 
which foreigners were not allowed to own more than 
27 Boniface Ahunwan ‘Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2002 journal of 
Business Ethics 37: 269-287. 
28 Ss 4, 5, and 6 of the NEPD. 
60% of shares and this included capital – intensive 
enterprises.29 
The ownership structure of the country 
prohibiting 100% of foreign ownership made a lot of 
foreign corporations to divest their shares. However, due 
to lack of local investment funds at the time, government 
became the major shareholder of the divested shares, 
although few local investors bought a small percentage 
of the shares.30 
Subsequently, the government became actively 
involved in the production sector of the country, either 
solely or as joint ventures with the foreign or local 
investors. In reality, the government policy on prohibition 
of absolute foreign investment in the country only 
operated to empower foreign investors as major 
partners with the government, leaving local investors as 
the minority. This, no doubt created abuse of minority 
rights as majority shareholders had control. Conflict 
between majority and minority shareholders remain a 
dominant problem of most developing countries with 
concentrated ownership structure.31 
The independence of the country further 
envisioned the need to provide a more comprehensive 
legal framework that better meets the development 
needs of the country, particularly the promotion of 
indigenous companies. This necessitated the establish-
ent of a Law Reform Commission to make recommend-
dations on the future of the country’s corporate sector 
while protecting the interest of investors, the general 
public and the nation as a whole. 
The recommendations of the Law Reform 
Commission saw the birth of the Companies and Allied 
Matters Decree (now Act) 1990.32 Part 1 and 2 of the Act 
provides that it shall apply to all companies formed and 
registered under it, as well as all existing companies, all 
companies formed or incorporated under other enactm-
ents and also all unregistered companies. 
IV. Shareholders Rights and 
Responsibilities under Nigerian 
Law 
Generally speaking, a shareholder is a part 
owner of any company who is also entitled to take part 
in the decision making of the company.33 SEC provides 
29 Orojo, J. O.: 1992, Company Law and Practice in Nigeria Mbeyi and 
Ass. Lagos. 
30 Akinsanya, A. A.: 1983, 'State Strategies towards Nigerian and 
Foreign Businesses', in L W. Zartman (ed.). The Political Economy of 
Nigeria (Preager, New York), p. 169. 
31 La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes. and A. Shleifer:1996, 'Lavv and 
Finance' (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.) Working Paper 
5661(1996). 
32 It can also be rightly said that CAMA is largely based on the UK 
Companies Act of 1948. 
33 See the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Shareholders 
Rights and Responsibilities. p.7 Available at www.proshare.com. Last 
accessed 17.10.13. 
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that the shareholder is also entitled to access 
information regarding to performance or otherwise of the 
company as it is contained in its yearly annual report. 
There is no doubt that a shareholder benefits favourably 
in form of turnovers and profits, otherwise known as 
dividends whenever the company is doing well.34 
CAMA provides for basic rights relating to 
shareholders which are highlighted below:35 
1. The right to attend general meetings in accordance 
with Section 81 of the Act36 
2. Right to speak and vote on any resolution 
3. Right to vote in person or in absentia. Likewise, 
equal effect shall be given to votes whether cast in 
person or in absentia 
4. Right to be furnished with sufficient and timely 
information regarding the date, location and agenda 
of the general meetings, as well as full and timely 
information regarding the issues that will be 
discussed at the meeting. 
5. Right to ask questions from the board and to place 
items on agenda at the general meeting, subject to 
reasonable limitations 
6. Right to be informed of any resolution appointing or 
approving the appointment of a director for the 
purpose of Section 256 of the CAMA37 
7. Right to sue for dividends in accordance with 
Section 385 of the CAMA38 
8. Right to have a copy of the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association, if any and a copy of any 
enactment which alters the memorandum in 
accordance with Section 42 of the CAMA 
9. Right of a preference share to more than one vote in 
accordance with Section 143 (1)(3) of the CAMA
 
10. Right to conveying or transferring shares
 
11. Rights of sharing in the residual  profits of a 
company
 
12. Rights to bonus and rights issue of a company
 
13. Right to inspect the register of members of the 
company
 
14. Right to be issued a share certificate
 
within three 
months of the close of the offer pursuant to Section 
146(1&2)
 
34  This is in the form of capital appreciation when the shares are 
actually worth more than when they are bought by the shareholders.  
35  See generally part IV, V and VIII of the CAMA. These are also 
highlighted in the SEC Shareholders Rights and Responsibilities supra 
36 Section 81 of the Act provides that every member of the company 
shall have the right to attend general meetings and vote provided that 
all sums payable with respect to their shares have been fully paid. 
37 Section 256 of the Act gives a restriction on the age of directors to 
70, failing which a special notice is required of any resolution 
appointing a director above the age of 70. 
38This defines dividends as special debts due to and recoverable by 
shareholders within 12 years and which is only actionable when 
declared. 
15. Right of shareholders vis-a-vis a prospectus that is 
being issued in an offer for subscription of shares 
by an issuer 
16. Right to be represented in an audit committee of the 
company 
17. Right to seek remedy in the case of aggrieved 
shareholders.39 
SEC, in the 2007 Code for Shareholders Rights 
and Responsibilities further sets out basic principles 
developed to promote shareholder voting rights and to 
help enhance shareholder value in Nigeria. These 
principles are discussed below:40 
To start with, as explained above, there exists a 
distinct relationship between shareholders and directors. 
This relationship is distinguished from normal contract-
ual relationships with contractual protection.41 Ordinarily, 
shareholders do not have contractual protection of their 
interests, but rather ‘rely’ on their elected board of 
directors and it is their responsibility to monitor and 
oversee the conduct of this board. As agents of the 
company, each director represents all shareholders and 
shareholders are entitled to expect that each director is 
acting in the interest of all shareholders and not in the 
interest of any majority shareholder or dominant 
stakeholder. Shareholders should be able to develop 
and maintain effective communication with directors 
through formal means. The board in turn, is responsible 
for representing the interest of the shareholders and 
when the board of directors fail to fulfil this fundamental 
obligation, shareholders are entitled to challenge the 
board based on this. 
Flowing from the above, it can be rightly said 
that there exists a stewardship relationship between the 
board and shareholders. This relationship is based in 
accountability of directors on their performance and 
conduct in the company and use of company’s assets 
and resources, although the articles of association 
usually reserves powers to the board of directors in the 
fulfilment of their duties. The collective responsibility of 
enhancing effective corporate governance lies in the 
hands of the board and this would normally mean a 
form of balancing relationship between the board, 
shareholders and stakeholders of the company.  
An important and fundamental measure of the 
stewardship role of the board lies in the company’s 
annual financial statement, which is simply an account 
of the financial performance of the company and mana-
gement of its assets. Statutorily, all directors of quoted 
companies are required to provide annual financial 
statements.42 It must be mentioned that the board and 
39 Remedy can be sought through the Investment and Securities 
Tribunal (IST) and the Administrative Proceedings Committee (APC) of 
the SEC. 
40 See SEC Shareholders Rights and Responsibilities supra at p.13-14 
41 For instance, customer-supplier relationships. 
42 See Section 331 -334 of CAMA.  
                                                             
                                                             

























































not the external auditors is responsible for ensuring that 
the financial statements give a ‘true’ and ‘fair’ view of the 
company’s financial situation for the year in question.43 
The board should therefore ensure that copies of the 
financial statements are sent to every shareholder and 
persons entitled to it. 
Furthermore, there is the principle of one share 
to one vote with regards to shareholders.44 This would 
mean that every member shall be entitled to vote on 
proportion to their economic stake and each share of 
ordinary stock should have one vote. In like manner, 
shareholders should be able to vote by proxy in an 
independent and confidential manner; this is to protect 
them from any possible undue influence and control. It 
is worth mentioning, that, although shareholders are 
very well entitled to proxy votes as an important tool by 
which they can perform their role in the governance of 
the company, where institutional investors have been 
entrusted with the investment funds of others, it is 
appropriate that they become active shareholders and 
help enhance effective corporate governance in the 
company in the exercise of their rights. As stated by 
SEC, institutional investors should also ensure that the 
internal corporate governance practices of the company 
come to terms with the global standards of 
accountability, transparency and judicial responsibility.45 
Also, SEC provides for the principle of simple 
majority which applies to mean that shareholders should 
have the right to approve matters brought before the 
meeting by a simple majority of the shares voted. The 
procedure for voting is provided for in Section 224 of the 
Act, and is generally made with a show of hands.46 The 
board is not ordinarily expected to impose super 
majority voting requirements unless this is done where 
there is a dominant shareholder in order to protect the 
interest of the minority shareholders. Voting should be 
made on each and every issue and done separately; the 
board is not to combine lump issues to be presented for 
shareholders’ single vote. Also, approval of increase in 
the authorized number of shares shared should be 
brought before shareholders who are to ensure that 
such increases are made with their corporate interests in 
mind.47 
43 Section 335 of the Act. It is worth mentioning that financial statemen-
ts and accounts were discussed in detail in the preceding chapter.  
44 See SEC supra at. P.11. 
45 See SEC supra at p.12. Institutional investors are financial 
intermedia-ries between lenders and borrowers charged with the role 
of acting as highly specialized investors on behalf of others. They 
include banks, insurance companies, pension funds and mutual 
funds. See http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institutionalinvestor.a 
sp Last accessed 17.10.13. 
46 By Section 224 (2), unless a poll is demanded, upon declaration by 
the chairman that a resolution has, on a show of hands been carried 
unanimously, or by a particular majority shall be conclusive evidence 
of the face, without proof of the number of proportion of the votes 
recorded in favour of, or against the resolution.   
47 See generally Section 224 of the Act. 
V. Shareholder Meetings 
One avenue where shareholders can exercise 
their rights especially when acting as a group is in a 
meeting. Shareholders’ meetings are generally classed 
as ‘General Meetings’ to which all shareholders have the 
right to attend and vote.48 CAMA identifies three types of 
meetings which are the Annual General Meetings 
(AGM)49, the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM)50 
and the Class meeting (CM).51 
It is important to note that only persons with 
requisite authority can convene a meeting, without which 
a meeting would be said to have been convened in 
error, and the notice issued for such meeting would be 
said to be invalid, while the resolution passed would be 
said to be null and void.52 The authorised persons that 
could convene a meeting include the board of directors, 
two or more shareholders with not less than 10 percent 
of the issued share capital of the company, shareh-
olders with not less than 10 percent of the paid up share 
capital of the company and also any director in the case 
of an Extra Ordinary General Meeting upon requisition.53 
By section 18 of the Act, the issuance of a 
notice is fundamental prior to the holding of any meeting 
and this is to be sent to all shareholders within 21 days 
from the date of the meeting. service of the notice can 
be done personally  or by post to their registered adder-
ss.54 It is also paramount to state that for shareholders 
entitled to receive additional notice, it is the duty of the 
company to make sure that such notice is given to them 
and by Section 222 of the Act, additional notice must be 
given via 2 daily newspapers at least 21 days before any 
48 Section 213 of the Act. 
49 Section 213 (1) of the Act provides that the AGM must be held each 
year, in addition to any other meeting in that year within a company’s 
first 18months of incorporation, following which it must be held once a 
year, in mot more than 15months after the last AGM or not more than 
6 months after the end of its financial year. 
50 The EGM’s are specially convened meetings designed to discuss 
matters that are too urgent to wait till the next AGM. By Section 215 (2) 
of the Act, an EGM may be requisitioned by any shareholder(s) 
holding at the date of the requisition not less than one-tenth of the 
paid up capital of the company as at the date of the deposit carrying 
the right of voting, or in the case of a company not having a share 
capital, shareholders of the company representing not less than one-
tenth of the total voting rights of all the shareholders having at the said 
date a right to vote at general meetings of the company. 
51 Class meetings refer to meetings held by holders of a particular 
class of shares, for example income shares, preference shares, etc 
and they are basically held with regard to the variation of rights that are 
attached to the class of shares. 
52 Failure to give notice of any meeting to any person entitled to 
receive it, invalidates such a meeting, unless such failure is based on 
an accidental omission. See generally Section 221 of the Act. 
53 See Section 215 of the CAMA. 
54 Registered address refers to any address which the shareholder has 
supplied for notice to be served to him. (Section 220 (5) of the Act). 
Where a notice is sent by post, by the provision of Sub Section 2 of the 
Section, this service is effected by properly addressing, preparing and 
posting the letter of service in the ordinary course of post, which is 
then deemed to have been effected after the expiration of 7 days. 
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general meeting.55 Section 18 of the Act also specifies 
the content of the notice which must include the name, 
type of meeting, place of meeting, date and time of the 
meeting, as well as an overview of the nature of 
business to be discussed in the meeting so as to enable 
the shareholders to decide whether or not to attend, and 
in the case where a special resolution is to be conside-
red at the meeting, the terms of this resolution shall be 
set out in the notice.56 
It is important to also state that attendance of 
annual general meeting is to be taken rather seriously by 
the shareholders as this responsibility creates an 
avenue for shareholders to exercise their rights. The 
responsibility of the shareholders to act as watchdogs 
over the directors and managers of the company as a 
means to safeguard their investments is exercised 
through attendance of meetings where questions can be 
raised. 
It is also worth noting that the shareholders are 
to ensure that the necessary quorum of meetings is 
attained and appropriate resolutions are passed during 
the meeting.57 Section 233 of the Act distinguishes an 
ordinary resolution from a special one when it states that 
an ordinary resolution is one passed by a simple 
majority of votes cast by such members of the company 
that are being entitled to do so and who have voted 
either in person or by proxy at a general meeting. A 
special resolution on the other hand, is one that has 
been passed by not less than three-fourth of the votes 
cast by every member of the company entitled to do so, 
either in person or by proxy at a general meeting to 
which 21 days notice was adequately given, specifying 
the intention to propose the resolution as a special 
resolution. 
Every meeting is to be presided over by a 
chairman who is to oversee the smooth conduct of the 
meeting.58 The chairman is to act in the bona fide 
55 Failure to give additional notice to such members that require it shall 
also invalidate the meeting as provided for in Section 221 above. 
56 The term ‘special resolution’ is defined subsequently in the course of 
the chapter. 
57 By Section 232 (1), unless otherwise provided in the Articles of 
Association, no business is to be transacted at any general meeting 
unless a quorum of members (i.e. shareholders) is present at the 
beginning of the meeting and throughout such meeting. Furthermore, 
the quorum of the meeting shall be one third of the total number of 
members of the company or 25 members, (whichever is less) present 
in person or by proxy (Subsection 2), and where there is a quorum at 
the beginning, but no quorum at the end due to any of the 
shareholders leaving for whatever reason, the meeting shall be 
adjourned for a week to the same place and time, and if there is no 
quorum still at the adjourned meeting, the members present then shall 
be the quorum and any decision made at the adjourned meeting shall 
bind other shareholders and where only one member was present, he 
may seek the direction of the court to take a decision. (S. 232(5)). 
58 See generally Section 240 of the Act. Where the chairman is not 
present within one hour of the meeting or where he is unwilling to act, 
the directors shall choose one of its members to act as chairman and 
in case where no director is present within one hour of the meeting or 
interest of the company, ensuring that the true intentions 
of the meeting are carried out with regards to all the 
issues raised before it.59 The chairman has the power to 
adjourn a meeting pursuant to Section 239 (1) of the 
Act.60 
VI. The Banking Crisis, Shareholders 
and the cbn 
The global financial crisis in Nigeria which 
began in mid-2008 saw an adverse effect on all sectors 
of the economy, particularly the banking sector and 
Nigerian Capital Markets.61 Subsequently, there was an 
immediate deterioration in value of assets owned by 
banks which posed liquidity issues across the affected 
banks. This led the CBN to conduct special 
investigations on all the 24 banks in the country at the 
time. It was not surprising that the investigations of the 
CBN confirmed peculiar challenges in the capital base 
requirements of these banks, owing to fraudulent 
practices and bad corporate governance.62 The CBN 
also injected a total of N420 bn ($2.8m) of government 
funds into the five banks for stabilisation and finally 
nationalised some of the banks in 2011.63 The nationa-
lisation saw the acquisition and birth of new banks while 
the CBN delisted the old banks from trading at the NSE. 
The result of this created panic and distress on the part 
of the shareholders as some of them merely woke up, 
only to realise that the banks have been acquired with 
new names of management and boards announced and 
as a result, many shareholders were left putting up their 
shares for sale. The NSE claimed that the CBN had not 
consult the Exchange at any point during the 
recapitalization and takeover. It also expressed concern 
on the fact that the decision of the CBN did not take into 
account neither of majority or minority shareholders’ 
interests who were gravely affected by the sudden 
takeovers.64 Treats were being made by shareholders to 
sue the CBN for their action and also the NSE for not 
fighting to protect their interests, therefore making their 
shares worthless.  
where none is willing to act, the shareholders are entitled to choose 
one of them to preside over the meeting as the chairman.  
59 Duties of the chairman also include: ensuring that proceedings are 
conducted in a regular manner as well as making sure that all issues 
brought before the meeting are promptly decided. See Section 240 (3) 
(a-e) of the Act. 
60 This is done with the consent of members present at the meeting 
which must also be in a quorum. See Subsection 1-4 of Section 239. 
61 Another major sector affected was the Oil and Gas sector.  
62 Details of the investigation have been explained in previous 
chapters. However, for the purpose of illustration, relevant aspects will 
be utilised to explore shareholders’ activities as it affects the banks in 
question. 
63 Source: http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/57904/1/nationalis 
ed-banks-shareholders-to-sue-cbn-ndic-am.html. last accessed 
18.10.13. 
64 Source http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/57904/1/nationalis 
ed-banks-shareholders-to-sue-cbn-ndic-am.html Last accessed 
18.10.13. 
                                                             
                                                                                                       

























































Series of opinions were given in reaction to the 
issue. Notably, the MD of Resource Trust and Company 
Limited (RTC)65 explained that the NSE had failed in its 
fundamental duty of protecting investors, concluding 
that the NSE could, indeed be said to be complicit in the 
series of events that have led to the banks’ abuses and 
problems that created the nationalisation of these 
banks.  
The ultimate losers in the banking crisis were 
investors who lost significant amount of money at the 
NSE on a weekly basis. In one day, investors lost 
N141.96 billion as the total value of all the shares listed 
at the Exchange dropped from 7.203 trillion from N7.345 
trillion to 7.203 trillion. Furthermore, the All Share Index 
dropped from 22,963.11 points to 22,519.32 points, a 
decline of nearly 1.93 per cent. The NSE Banking index 
also declined by 4.22 per cent; from 317.33 points to 
303.93.66 This decrease was brought about by the 
massive decline in the share price of majority of the 
banks.  
The question which then comes to mind is 
whether or not one or more of the shareholders could 
have been part of the activities that led to the banking 
crisis and problems in the NSE. Evidence published by 
the CBN reveals that companies and individuals owe the 
five banks a total of N348.409 billion.67 
It is important to emphasize that many of these 
non performing loans were granted to companies, some 
of which were wholly or partly owned by the CEO’s 
themselves and the rest by customers of the banks. 
There is no evidence on the list published by the CBN to 
suggest that individual shareholders were part of the 
debtors.68 It therefore suffices to say that majority of the 
non-performing loans were granted to customers and 
CEO’s of the banks (In the name of their companies), 
who, by all indication would have been part of the 
ongoing control fraud. 
What is also not surprising is that the CBN 
published list of debtors includes names of renowned 
dignitaries, top politicians and business men across the 
country. However, what is shocking is the revelation of 
two presidents of the Nigerian Stock Exchange as major 
debtors in these banks. First is Forbes rated richest man 
65 The RTC is a company that helps to provide support and advisory 
services to Market clients within various sectors of the economy. See 
http://www.resourcesandtrust.com/services.html last accessed 
15.10.13. 
66 Figures of the 9th of August 2011. Source: http://www.thenigerianvoi 
ce.com/nvnews/57904/1/nationalised-banks-shareholders-to-sue-cbn-
ndic-am.html Last accessed 18.10.13. 
67Source: CBN list of debtors available at: http://www.cenbank.org/Out 
/publications/pressRelease/GOV/2009/ADVERTORIAL2.pdf last acess-
ed 15.10.13. 
68 See the CBN list of debtors supra. It is important to state that the 
CBN had identified most of these debtors as Shareholders and 
Directors of the companies by which they borrowed these monies and 
most of these companies were owned by CEO’s and employees of the 
banks. Others were monies borrowed by customers. 
in Nigeria and the then NSE president, Aliko Dangote69 
who, according to the CBN has a non-performing loan 
of N2.5 billion with oceanic bank which was secured 
through Dangote Industries Limited;70 Second is Mr Oba 
Otudeko, an immediate past president of the NSE owes 
N1.6 billion to Oceanic bank through his company, 
Honeywell Group.71 
Questions that would come to mind at this 
stage is: How come the shareholders did nothing to 
stop the fraud? One possible answer would be that they 
were probably ignorant of these frauds. As the banks 
showed no apparent sign of distress, publishing 
financial statements that suggested economic boom, it 
is possible that the shareholders were indeed unaware 
of the insider abuse. However, it remains to be said 
whether they their ignorance is due to their passive 
nature where they were unaware of their rights and 
responsibilities.  
The revelation of the CBN upon its special 
examination of these banks triggered questions by the 
shareholders to the CBN, NSE, directors and manage-
ment of these banks, demanding that due process be 
followed to ensure that the relevant persons are held 
accountable for their actions.  
One case is that of Afribank, now known as 
Mainstream Bank Limited. 
Upon the initial sacking of the CEO’s of the five 
banks in 2009, a number of Afribank’s shareholders, 
namely; Igbrude Oke, Rasak Mumuni, Akinsanya 
Sunday, Suleiman Babatunde and Igba Olatomide, in a 
bid to request for the result of the special examination, 
had, on behalf of themselves and other shareholders of 
the bank72 challenged the CBN’s action at the Federal 
High Court in Lagos where the Trial Judge, Justice 
James Tosho, held in a ruling that the CBN did not have 
the absolute power to hire or fire bank directors without 
disclosing findings of the so called ‘special examination’ 
conducted into the financial statements of these banks 
and their affected directors.73 The court further held that 
although he CBN had power to regulate and control the 
business activities of these banks under Section 35 of 
69 See http://www.forbes.com/global2000/#p_144_s_acompanyRank 
Overall_All_All_All Last accessed 06.08.2013. 
70 http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/10/cbn-releases-fresh-list-of-ban 
k-debtors/ last accessed 10.10.13. see also the CBN publication 
supra. 
71 Other top bad debtors listed by CBN include Mr. Femi Otedola, 
N12.8 billion (Intercontinental Bank) through his company, African 
Petroleum Plc and another N6.2 billion is owed Union Bank through 
his Zenon Oil; and Mr. Jimoh Ibrahim, N14.78 billion (Oceanic Bank), 
through Global Fleet Industries Limited. - Source: http://www.vanguard 
ngr.com/2009/10/cbn-releases-fresh-list-of-bank-debtors/#sthash.NM 
rZTvFW.dpuf Last accessed 17.10.13. 
72  See http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/shareholders-appeal-afri 




case-afribank-shareholders Last accessed 17.10.13. 
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the BOFIA, disclosure should and must be made when 
such powers would substantially affect interested parties 
as in this case.74 However, an appeal was launched by 
the CBN and its governor contending the decision, with 
a motion for stay of proceedings pending the 
determination of the appeal. However, while the matter 
was still pending in the appeal court, the CBN, in 
collaboration with the Nigerian Deposits Insurance 
Commission (NDIC) and the Asset Management 
Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) nationalised Afribank.75 
The shareholders then filed a motion to nullify the 
nationalisation, claiming that it was done pending an 
appeal and also in disrespect to the court and that the 
CBN had filed the motion for stay of proceedings in 
order to frustrate the diligent prosecution of the case. 
The above scenario was further compounded 
when the CBN filed another suit at the Federal High 
Court in Lagos, winding up the bank. Justice Charles 
Archibong, in his decision, wound up Afribank on the 
ground that the bank had been delisted by the CBN and 
therefore had no licence to continue to operate.76 
Further efforts of the shareholders to challenge the 
decision have proved abortive till date. 
From the above, it can be said that the 
shareholders of Afribank were ignorant of the insider 
abuse and control fraud in the bank and the revelations 
of the CBN triggered their demand for questions. 
However, these attempts of shareholders to demand for 
answers have been frustrated and while it can be rightly 
said that the CBN acted ultra vires its powers in sacking 
the CEO’s without publishing the results of its special 
investigations, and subsequently winding up the bank, 
the judiciary is also to blame for turning a deaf ear to all 
the cries of the shareholders and ultimately carrying out 
a grave miscarriage of justice. The shareholders argued 
through their counsel, Mr Onyebuchi Aniakor, that the 
winding up order was made by Justice Archibong when 
the matter was stated for mention and not hearing.77 
Furthermore, upon the winding up petition brought by 
the CBN, the shareholders had made a preliminary 
objection to the petition, claiming that there was a 
pending suit before Justice Tosho of the same court and 
also arguing that the winding up petition is a calculated 
effort by the CBN to overreach the pending suit. What is 
surprising is that this preliminary objection was struck 
out by the court. A number of issues would arise, 




75 The nationalisation of Afribank was done with two other banks: 
BankPhB and Spring Bank which saw the birth of Mainstreat Bank, a 
newly formed bank. 
76 Source: Vanguard news.16th July 2012 Available at: http://www.van 
guardngr.com/2012/07/shareholders-appeal-afribanks-liquidation/ last 
accessed 19.10.13. 
77 See Vanguard News, 16th July 2012 supra. 
questioning the independence of the judiciary and the 
power and manipulation exhibited by the CBN.  
However, in the case of Oceanic Bank Plc, now 
known as Ecobank, the shareholders, in an Extra-
Ordinary General Meeting held with Ecobank on 23rd 
December 2011 approved the proposed resolution to 
merge both banks, transferring all assets, liabilities and 
undertakings of Oceanic bank, including real and 
intellectual property to Ecobank Nigeria. In consideration 
for the transfer of all assets, liabilities and undertakings 
of Oceanic Bank to Ecobank, the shareholders of 
Oceanic Bank are to receive a total of 16,111,111,111 
billion new shares in Ecobank Nigeria, credited as fully 
paid-up; and N2, 600,000,000 to be credited to Oceanic 
Bank shareholders as deposit for shares in Ecobank 
Nigeria issued to Oceanic Bank shareholders as equity 
at N2.34  per Ecobank Nigeria share at a date to be 
mutually agreed by the shareholder of both banks. 78  
Perhaps what is seen in the case of Oceanic 
bank is management agenda control where the 
incentives offered for the merger led to its approval. 
However, what is seen is a situation where the share-
holders were given an opportunity to vote for or against 
the resolution at the EGM, as opposed to the imposition 
of a decision.  
VII. Shareholder Activism in Nigeria 
Corporate governance embodies the totality of 
systems by which companies are directed and control-
led79 and this involves promoting fairness, accountability 
and transparency within the organisation, the frictions 
that arise due to this are sometimes expressed through 
shareholder activism.  
Following the banking crisis in Nigeria, coupled 
with the activities of CBN, CEO’s and the threat of 
collapse of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, shareholders 
have been awakened to their rights and responsibilities 
in Nigeria. A number of shareholder associations have 
been developed by shareholders as avenues for exerci-
sing their rights as a group. These include Proactive 
Shareholder Association, the Nigerian Shareholders’ So-
lidarity Association and the Independent Shareholders’ 
Association of Nigeria.  
Adegbite and Amao consider the extent to 
which a country’s local shareholder activism is a reflect-
ion of its brand of politics.80 They describe shareholder 
activism as a corporate governance accountability 
mechanism, whether at the managerial or board level.81  
Shareholder activism consists of a variety of activities 
through which shareholders influence the management 
78 Source: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/ecobank-oceanic-
shareholders-okay-merger/ Lass accessed 17.10.13.  
79 This definition is generally attributed to Sir Adrian Cadbury. 
80 Adegbite, E. And Amao, K. ‘The Politics of Shareholder Activism in 
Nigeria’ (2012) Journal of Business and Ethics 105: 389-402. 
81 Adegbite, E. And Amao, K. supra at p. 391. 
                                                             
                                                             

























































and board. This can be in form of meetings, letter writing 
or associations as the case may be.82 Gillian and Starks 
considers a shareholder activist as an investor who, 
thorough his voice, endeavours to change situations of 
concern, while not necessarily resulting to change in the 
firms control.83 
There is no gainsaying that shareholder 
activism is peculiar to target firms and rationales for 
shareholder activism differ according to countries. 
However, contrary to the general view that shareholder 
activism is driven by the desire to maximize share-
holders’ wealth; there is evidence to suggest the need 
for responsible ownership as inclination to shareholder 
activism.84 
Having said that, it follows that shareholder 
activism in Nigeria has been influenced by the political 
culture of the country. Corruption has mainly been a 
drawback for Nigeria since Independence and seemed 
to have eaten deep into as spheres of the economy, 
including the corporate sector. Adegbite and Amao, in 
their survey of the politics of shareholder activism in 
Nigeria, also considered the link between politics and 
pursuit of corporate interests and found that companies 
bidding for government contracts are forced to play by 
the rule of politicians.85 The success of any business is 
therefore dependent upon its level of political will and 
support. Going back to the case of Afribank’s share-
holders, the level of political and power influence utilised 
to frustrate shareholder activism is shocking. While 
shareholders are constantly demanding accountability 
and transparency of directors, management and regula-
tory bodies, their activities are constantly undermined 
even at the judiciary l level where justice is meant to be 
done. 
That notwithstanding, there is also a 
fundamental problem of misconception and misuse of 
shareholder activism by members to the extent that they 
are gradually being conceived as a threat to the 
organisations’ day to day management.86 This is based 
on the manner by which shareholder associations tend 
to comport themselves in the exercise of their rights, 
such as bullying and boycotting of AGMs. Commenting 
on this, Adegbite and Amao noted that some members 
of shareholder associations have expressed their 
82 See Becth et al. (2009). Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence 
from a clinical study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund. The Review of 
Financial Studies 22 (8), 3093-3129. 
83 Gillian, S.L., and Starks, L. T. (1998). A survey of Shareholder Activi-
sm: Motivation and empirical evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 
12(3) 275-305. 
84 See Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., and Roberts, J. (2007). 
Responsible Ownership, Shareholder value and the new Shareholder 
activism. Competition and Change, 11(3), 223-240, See also Sarkar, J., 
and Sarkar, S. (2000). Large shareholder activism in corporate 
governance in developing countries, Evidence from India. International 
Review of Finance, 1(3), 161-194. 
85 Adegbite and Amao supra at. P. 396. 
86 Adegbite and Amao supra. 
concern on the way some of their members conduct 
themselves through negative publicity arising from 
threats and disruptions of meetings.87 Perhaps this 
action is triggered out of frustration and as a means of 
cry for help, but to whom? 
VIII. conclusion 
This paper examined the Nigeria’s shareholding 
structure and investigates the activities of shareholders 
in the banking crisis. It can be said that although 
adequate legal provisions exists in the CAMA and SEC 
Code for Shareholders as to educate shareholders of 
their rights and responsibilities, it was not until the crisis 
that shareholders actually started exercising these 
rights.  They can therefore be said to have been passive 
and more concerned with the financial turnovers of the 
company as opposed to activities of the board, thus, 
providing a perfect environment for control fraud. 
Black identifies legal rules, conflicts of interests 
and manager agenda control as factors that can create 
shareholder passivity.88 According to him, many 
institutional investors depend on the management and 
board for the business of the company; they therefore 
face conflicts of interests if they monitor corporate 
managers. Managers, on the other hand, mostly control 
shareholders’ voting agenda especially on decisions 
that can have substantive outcomes.89 
 Despite the legal rules in place emphasizing 
shareholders’ voting rights and also prohibiting 
management agenda control, shareholder activism in 
Nigeria is still emerging and it can be said that under a 
more facilitating regulatory and judicial environment, 
associations might do much more. 
In view of this, some shareholder associations 
have developed a list of problems encountered by shar-
eholders which can be said to be contributory factor to 
the crisis experienced in the corporate economy. 
Their findings were published by the House of 
Representatives Report of the Ad-hoc committee on the 
investigation into the near collapse of the Nigerian 
Capital Market, most of which are highlighted below:90 
- Manipulation of the market using delisted 
companies 
- Regulatory failure of the financial sector regulators 
- Sensitive banking reforms 
- Investors’ ignorance 
- Lack of co-ordinated relationship between 
shareholders and the SEC 
87 Adegbite and Amao supra. 
88 Bernard S. Black. Agents watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor voice. UCLA Law Review Vol 39: 811-893 at 814. 
89 Black, supra. 
90 See the Report of the Ad-hoc committee on the investigation into the 
near collapse of the Nigerian Capital Market. P.11-14 Available at: 
www.proshare.com Last accessed 18.10.13. 
                                                             
                                                             
The Nature of Shareholding in Nigeria: Evidence from the Banking Crisis
42























































- Corporate failure in the institutional and governance 
structure of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
- The Nationalisation of Shareholders Investments in 
Afribank, Bank PHB and Spring Bank. 
- Enforcement failure 
The Committee, while evaluating the above 
issues raised by the associations, noted that ignorance 
of the investors provided a vacuum for the board of 
directors, managers and regulators to effect a sustained 
control fraud. Corruption and incompetence remains 
apparent in the financial system and capital markets 
with the government a mere observer.91 
Although, it can be said that effective 
shareholder activism can promote effective corporate 
governance, in Nigeria, while shareholder activism tends 
to be emerging and should be encouraged, the level of 
corruption and power influence exhibited during the 
banking crisis suggests a more institutionalised problem 
in the country. 
Bibliography 
a) BOOKS 
1. Bob Tricker, Coporate Governance, Principles and 
Practices, 2009 Oxford University Press. 
2. Clarke, T. (ed) Theories of Corporate Governance: 
The philosophical foundations of Corporate Govern-
ance, 2004 Routledge. 
3. Orojo, J. O.: 1992, Company Law and Practice in 
Nigeria Mbeyi and Ass. Lagos. 
4. Robert A.G. Monks, Nell Minow: Corporate gover-
nance - 2nd ed. 2001Oxford Blackwell Business 
Press. 
5. Robin Hollington, Q.C. Shareholders’ Rights 4th ed. 
2004 Sweet and Maxwell. 
b) ARTICLES AND PUBLICATIONS 
1. Adegbite, E. And Amao, K. ‘The Politics of 
Shareholder Activism in Nigeria’ (2012) Journal of 
Business and Ethics 105: 389-402. 
2. Akinsanya, A. A.: 1983, 'State Strategies towards 
Nigerian and Foreign Businesses', in L W. Zartman 
(ed.). The Political Economy of Nigeria (Preager, 
New York), p. 169. 
3. Bernard S. Black. Agents watching Agents: The 
Promise of Institutional Investor voice. UCLA Law 
Review Vol 39: 811-893 at 814. 
4. Boniface Ahunwan
 
‘Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria 2002 journal of Business Ethics 37: 269-287
 
5. Eisenhardt K.M. , Agency Theory, An Assessment 





See the Report of the Ad-hoc Committee supra at p. 13. 
6. Elewechi N. M. Okike, Corporate Governance in 
Nigeria: the status quo, 2007 Volume 15 Number 2 
March  p.173 – 193. 
7. Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C. 1983. "Separation of 
ownership and control", Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301-25. 
8. Gillian, S.L., and Starks, L. T. (1998). A survey of 
Shareholder Activism: Motivation and empirical 
evidence. Journal of Corporate Finance 12(3) 275-
305. 
9. Hendry, J., Sanderson, P., Barker, R., and Roberts, 
J. (2007). Responsible Ownership, Shareholder 
value and the new Shareholder activism. Compe-
tition and Change, 11(3), 223-240. 
10. Jensen, M and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Econo-
mics, 3, 305-360. 
11. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes. and A. 
Shleifer:1996, 'Lavv and Finance' (National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Inc.) Working Paper 
5661(1996). 
12. Sarkar, J., and Sarkar, S. (2000). Large shareholder 
activism in corporate governance in developing 
countries, Evidence from India. International Review 
of Finance, 1(3), 161-194. 
c) LEGISLATIONS 
1. Banks and Other Financial Instruments Act (BOFIA) 
1991. 
2. Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990. 
3. Foreign Exchange Act of 1962. 
4. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) No. 
4 of 1972. 
d) REGULATIONS AND REPORTS 
1. Report of the Ad-hoc committee on the investigation 
into the near collapse of the Nigerian Capital 
Market, National Assembly, Abuja, Resolution No 
(HR70/2012). 






nnesburgStockExchange.html Last assessed 27.08.11 
http://www.nse.com.ng/AboutUs/Pages/The-NSE.aspx 
last accessed 20.10.13 
http://www.nigerianstockexchange.com/quoted_compa
nies.jsp Last Accessed 06-08-http://www.forbes.com/ 
global2000/#p_144_s_acompanyRankOverall_All_All_Al
l Last accessed 06.08.2011 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/institutionalinvestor
.asp  Last accessed 17.10.13 
www.proshare.com 
                                                            
 



























































Last accessed 19.10.13 
http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/57904/1/natio
nalised-banks-shareholders-to-sue-cbn-ndic-am.html 





Last accessed 18.10.13 
CBN list of debtors available at: 
http://www.cenbank.org/Out/publications/pressRelease/
GOV/2009/ADVERTORIAL2.pdf last accessed 15.10.13 
http://www.forbes.com/global2000/#p_144_s_acompan
yRankOverall_All_All_All Last accessed 06.08.2013 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/10/cbn-releases-













ationnal&Itemid=559 last accessed 12.10.13 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/07/shareholders-app 
eal-afribanks-liquidation/ last accessed 19.10.13 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/ecobank-oceanic 
-shareholders-okay-merger/ Lass accessed 17.10.13.  
The Nature of Shareholding in Nigeria: Evidence from the Banking Crisis
44
© 2014   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
Bu
sin
es
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
  
  
  
V
ol
um
e 
X
IV
 I
ss
ue
 V
 V
er
sio
n 
I
Ye
ar
20
14
  
 
(
)
  
 B
